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Attorneys’ Fees. Kumble v. Voccola, 253 A.3d 1248 (R.I.
2021). Trustees are entitled to indemnification of reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred on behalf of a trust. In executing
a trust, Title 18 of the Rhode Island General Laws § 18-6-1 gives
the trial court authority to grant interest on attorneys’ fees.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 2002, Frederick Carrozza, Jr. (Carrozza) “created a will that,
upon his death, would form two testamentary trusts.”1 He passed
away that same year and named the plaintiffs, Michael Voccola
(Voccola) and Daniel Shedd (hereinafter the trustees) co-trustees of
both trusts; in return for their services as trustees, they were to
receive “reasonable compensation.”2 Voccola also served as the executor of Carrozza’s will.3 The defendants, Angela Giguere Kumble
and Christine Tellefsen (hereinafter the beneficiaries) were Carrozza’s wife and daughter.4 Carrozza owned multiple properties
that became part of the trust estate.5 Voccola permitted the beneficiaries to continue to manage those properties, as they had before
Carrozza’s death.6
Shortly after Carrozza died, his family members filed suit
against Voccola and the beneficiaries “to impose a trust on the properties for the benefit of the Carrozza family.”7 Attorney Evan
Leviss was hired to represent the estate and the beneficiaries.8
However, “the relationship between the trustees and beneficiaries
fractured over time,” and Voccola discharged Attorney Leviss and
“informed the beneficiaries that he had retained the law firm of
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Duffy & Sweeney and intended to hire a third-party management
company to oversee the trusts’ properties . . . .”9 Voccola then liquidated one of the trust properties and used the proceeds to pay his
own attorneys’ fees, without first disclosing his intentions to the
beneficiaries.10
In 2012, the defendants filed a complaint for specific performance and injunctive relief, “asking that the trustees distribute the
trust assets to Tellefsen and [the court bar them] from making any
further disbursements from the trusts, from transferring management of the trust properties to a company or individual other than
the beneficiaries’, and from removing the trusts’ previous counsel.”11 The trial court subsequently granted the trustees a writ of
replevin, demanding the beneficiaries and Attorney Leviss “return
property and records belonging to the estate and trust.”12
The protracted litigation between the beneficiaries and trustees resulted in $1,040,293.75 of attorneys’ fees.13 In December
2012, the parties agreed to settle on grounds “that if trust assets
were insufficient to pay for any expenses, fees or liabilities incurred
in the administration of the Trusts and approved by the court, [the
beneficiaries] shall personally indemnify the [t]rustees.”14 The consent order terminated the trustees’ access to trust assets; thus, the
trustees filed a petition for fees incurred in the administration of
the trusts, including attorneys’ fees owed to Duffy & Sweeney.15
In May 2017, the trial court consolidated the beneficiaries’ action with the trustees’ action holding a nonjury trial awarding compensation to Voccola as executor of Carrozza’s estate, as well as to
the trustees for their work.16 After determining that the trustees
were entitled to the fees they sought, the trial court held they could
indemnify the trust for their attorneys’ fees.17 The trial court reasoned first, “the consent order provided that the beneficiaries would
indemnify the professional fees of the trustees if the trust assets
9.
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were insufficient” and second “that he had both contractual authority, under the consent order, and statutory authority, [under section] 18-6-1, to award attorneys’ fees.”18
Only one month later, the beneficiaries sought the release of all
real estate, as well as the partial release of the trust funds from the
escrow account, arguing that the trustees were “substantially oversecured.”19 The beneficiaries specifically disputed “the hourly rate
billed; whether the ‘protracted hearings’ were the joint responsibility of the parties; whether certain expenses were reimbursable; and
whether the trustees’ counsel was successful, a factor that the trial
justice found went to the issue of the proportionality of the fees requested to the success of the litigation.”20
The trial court granted the trustees’ request for attorneys’
fees.21 The court first considered the opinion of expert legal counsel
put forth by the trustees’ that “the hourly legal-fee rate was reasonable.”22 Second, the court concluded, pro-rata, that neither side was
more responsible for litigation costs than the other.23 In determining proportionality, “the trial justice indicated that the action entailed more than the trustees recovering compensation for administering the trust and estate”; specifically, the lower courts resolved
the “other claims made by the beneficiaries” in favor of the trustees.24 Thus, the court granted the attorneys’ fees in the full
amount.25
The parties disputed whether prejudgment interest was appropriate.26 Enmeshed in the interest issue was the distinction between trustees’ fees and the reimbursement of legal fee expenses.27
The beneficiaries had previously paid prejudgment interest and further contended “the fees were not ‘due or owing’ until the trial justice awarded them.”28 Additionally, they questioned whether an
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interest award was equitable “given that the time between the trial
and the trial justice’s decision and the ultimate award of fees was
lengthy and no fault of the beneficiaries.”29
In 2018, the trial court reached its conclusions in determining
judgment for the trustees.30 First, the beneficiaries were on notice
and did not object to “the retainer agreement” of the trustees’ counsel.31 Second, a one percent per month fee was reasonable under
section 18-6-1.32 Therefore, the trial court found $1,091,981.66 in
attorneys’ fees reasonable and subject to indemnification, with interest on the attorneys’ fees set at $431,654.26, which would accrue
at the rate of $268.10 per day through the conclusion of any appeal.33 The beneficiaries appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island on all issues discussed above related to the award and interest of attorneys’ fees.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court order in granting the trustees action to indemnify
the Carrozza trust for their services, expenses, attorneys’ fees incurred, and interest owed on those fees.34 The Court relied on the
rule outlined in Tri-Town Construction Co. v. Commerce Park Associates 12 LLC.,35 which requires affidavits or expert testimony
“from counsel who is a member of the Rhode Island Bar and who is
not representing the parties to the action.”36 Additionally, the
Court noted that Colonial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v.
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Contemporary Construction Co.,37 which established the factors for
assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, remains good
law.”38
The parties disputed the following: first, whether the award of
attorneys’ fees and costs was unreasonable, disproportionate, and
an abuse of discretion because the trial justice ignored “material
factors deserving significant weight.”39 Additionally disputed was
the trustees’ award of what the beneficiaries termed “fees for fees,”
petitioning the trial court to make a “significant downward adjustment” of the fees incurred.40 Second, whether the award of interest
was contrary to the law and the facts and subject to de novo review
for errors of law.41 Finally, although the parties “agreed on many
of the Colonial Plumbing factors,” they disputed four points—”the
hourly rate billed; whether the ‘protracted hearings’ were the joint
responsibility of the parties; whether certain expenses were reimbursable; and whether the trustees’ counsel was successful.”42
A. Award of Reasonable Fees
Conducting a de novo review, the Court rejected the first argument and found the award of attorneys’ fees reasonable and in
alignment with the Colonial Plumbing factors.43 In Tri-Town, the
Court held that evidence of reasonable attorneys’ fees requires affidavits or expert testimony “from counsel who is a member of the
Rhode Island Bar and who is not representing the parties to the

37. 464 A.2d 741, 743 (R.I. 1983) (finding eight factors in assessing the
reasonableness of a fee: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by
the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent).
38. Kumble, 253 A.3d at 1261–62.
39. Id. at 1263.
40. Id.
41. See generally id. at 1264.
42. Id. at 1262.
43. Id. at 1261–63.
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action.”44 Here, the Court held that the trial justice correctly
granted attorneys’ fees because the trustees met this requirement.45 The Court reasoned that the award of attorneys’ fees was
reasonable because the trial justice acknowledged and weighed the
Colonial Plumbing factors after assessing the evidence.46
B. Award of Fees and Costs to the Winner
The trial court was not required to consider the “proportionality of the fee award,” that decision was discretionary.47 The Court
rejected the argument that the trial justice abused his discretion by
ignoring “material factors deserving significant weight.”48 Under
neither Tri-Town nor Colonial Plumbing did this Court require the
trial justice to weigh the evidence proportionally; however, here, the
trial justice weighed the trustees’ success on the substantial claims
asserted against the beneficiaries.49 The Court reasoned that not
only did the trial justice consider the material factors of the case,
but he considered proportionality, an additional factor that was not
required.50 Further, the majority did not opine on whether this
other factor was helpful or necessary.51 Still, it concluded that the
lower court did not ignore any material factors of the case in light
of this decision.52
C. Stipulated to Indemnification
The Carrozza family members challenged the trust, and the
trustees incurred costs and expenses in defending it.53 The Court
held the trustees were entitled to indemnify the Carrozza trust for
attorneys’ fees and expenses.54 The beneficiaries contend the trustees volitionally fired Attorney Leviss and hired Duffy & Sweeney;
moreover, that the trustees should bear some of the burdens of costs
44.
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54.
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and fees because litigation was unavoidable.55 The Court reasoned
that the trial justice correctly found that the trustees were entitled
to indemnify the Carrozza trust: first, because section 18-6-1 provides the courts statutory authority; second, the parties’ consent order contained an indemnity provision.56 Finally, the Court found
that the beneficiaries waived appellate consideration on the issue
of “fees for fees” because they did not appeal this matter in the lower
court.57
D. Award of Interest
Among other contentions, the beneficiaries specifically argued
there was no basis to award interest, and to the extent that the trial
judge was going to treat it like a service charge, it was subject to
the Tri-Town analysis.58 The Court rejected this argument and
found the award of interest was not in error as a matter of law.59
Title 18 of the Rhode Island General Laws § 18-6-1 provides “[e]very
trustee under any trust instrument, whether previously or subsequently made, shall be entitled to reasonable expenses and costs
incurred in the execution of the trust, and also reasonable compensation for services rendered as trustee[.]”60 The Court held that the
trial justice properly concluded that the trustees were entitled to
indemnify the Carrozza trust for the accrued interests on their costs
and expenses in defending it.61 In the scope of their duty, the trustees relinquished the beneficiaries of their managerial control over
the trust properties, which resulted in the beneficiaries’ retaliatory
demands and, ultimately, a long and protracted string of litigation.62 The Court reasoned the trial justice was correct to award
interest to the trustees not just because section 18-6-1 conferred
statutory authority but because they prevailed in showing they
were not at fault for the expenses and obligatorily acted as fiduciaries.63
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See generally id. at 1254–56.
See id. at 1263–64.
Id.
Id. at 1264–65.
See id. at 1266–68.
See 18 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 18-6-1 (2013).
Kumble, 253 A.3d at 1266–67.
See id. at 1249–50.
Id.
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E. Statutory Interest
There is a statutory scheme for calculating interest rates on
trustee incurred expenses and costs in Rhode Island, including attorneys’ fees.64 The Court held “the interest rate charged under the
retainer agreement, in this case, [sic] was the same rate as that
provided under the prejudgment interest statute and is thus reasonable as a matter of law.”65 The beneficiaries conflate many interest arguments to contend that the interest calculation is subject
to the Tri-Town analysis; the fees awarded were because of indemnification, not damages, thus, not subject to interest; and finally, an
award of interest is punitive.66 The Court reasoned categorically
rejecting all of the contentions mentioned above because the precedent in Tri-Town solely provides to determine the “reasonableness
of an expense incurred in the execution of a trust” and affirmed that
in this case, section 18-6-1 provides the proper interest calculations.67 Additionally, the trustees’ submitted all pretrial documents with interest rates, per section 18-6-1.68 Finally, the “extraordinarily large sum of interest” is not punitive but fair as a
matter of law because “the [hired] law firm extended credit in the
form of forgoing timely payment of its bills in exchange for interest
to be paid.”69 Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that granted the trustee’s claims for attorneys’ fees and denied the beneficiaries’ counterclaims.70
F. Justice, Fairness, and Proportionality
Justice Robinson authored a dissenting opinion in which he
stressed the importance of reducing the attorneys’ fees and interest
awarded in this case by more than a de minimis amount.71 Although Justice Robinson wrote that he agreed with the majority’s
“powerful arguments” that support their result, he felt that the majority was disregarding the “staggering amount of the attorneys’
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 1264.
Id.
See id. at 1263–64.
See id. at 1264.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1267–68.
Id.
Id. at 1268–69 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
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fees at issue.”72 Justice Robinson argued that the substantial delays in the course of this litigation were not solely attributable to
the beneficiaries and that the Court’s jurisprudence suggests “reducing the [awarded] attorneys’ fees and costs to an amount the
Court determined would be ‘just, fair, and proportional.’”73
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s ruling avoids court disputes
over attorneys’ fees awards and sets a precedent of predictability in
determining attorneys’ fees in estate planning matters. The Court
acknowledged the legislative intent entitling trustees to reasonable
expenses and costs incurred in the execution of the trust and reasonable compensation for services rendered as trustee. It also
found from the statutory language that the bills incurred by trustees in the administration of a trust, including interest accrued, if
reasonable, are indemnifiable trust expenses under section 18-6-1.
This decision reinforces the notion that trust beneficiaries, although provided broad rights, are not entitled to play an active role
in every decision the trustee makes about the trust. Although communication is preferable between trustees and trust beneficiaries
before selling trust property, it is not generally a requirement.
Thus, the Court’s ruling maintains the status quo for litigation in
the American system of legal fees.
The American Rule is a rule in the United States justice system that says two opposing sides in a legal matter must pay their
attorney fees, regardless of who wins the case.74 The rule’s rationale should not deter a plaintiff from bringing a case to court for
fear of prohibitive costs. In furtherance of the legislative policies of
the rule, the Court here not only allowed the trustees to collect attorneys’ fees incurred and interest owed on those fees but, in doing
so, likely provided the unhindered managerial ability of decedents’
assets to trust beneficiaries. Similarly, it reinforces policies to
maintain the judicial economy. In the context of encouraging desirable litigation, “it is contingent fees (now supplemented by

72. Id.
73. See id. (quoting Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich,
880 A.2d 784, 802 (R.I. 2005)).
74. See generally John Leubsdorf, Does the American Rule Promote Access
to Justice? Was that Why It Was Adopted? 67 DUKE L. J. 257 (2018).
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litigation financing), one-way fee-shifting statutes, and other institutions that do the heavy work.”75 Fee shifting statutes like Rhode
Island’s section 18-6-1 provide a “[o]ne-way fee” to encourage what
the legislature and courts have deemed desirable litigation.76 However, there is a fine line delineating desirable and encouraged litigation, and a burdened judicial economy, such as those of most jurisdictions, including Rhode Island, appreciate that “litigation
cannot be regarded as so delightful that it should always and in all
circumstances be promoted.”77 Actions for breach of fiduciary duties remain viable challenges to trust beneficiaries; however, litigants can expect trustees to protect their decisions vehemently to
collect attorneys’ fees and interest owed on those fees from trust
assets when meritorious.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that trustees may indemnify a trust for their services, expenses, attorneys’ fees, and interest owed on those fees when reasonable and within Rhode Island
laws. Moreover, the Court determined that awarding an “extraordinarily large sum of interest” in attorneys’ fees is not dispositive of
injustice, unfairness, and disproportionality.
Aryamen Andrew Omshehe

75. See id. at 270.
76. See generally id.
77. See id.

